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Abstract
Globalisation have generated a more or less competetive market according to the kind of ﬁrms.
The Great moderation has structural causes such as market power, which is possible to study
through the reduced form of the NKPC obtained with the Calvo and Rotemberg price setting
assumptions. The Calvo model fails to predict the increase of price volatility on Business to
Business (BotB) product markets where competition has deﬁnitively increased. By using a
model with upstream and downstream ﬁrms, according to the Theory of ﬁrm Literature, where
both are constraint by the Rotemberg price setting assumption, the model predicts the Great
Moderation in OECD economies only if the hypothesis of an increase in the global markup
is kept. Simulations replicate NKPC slope empirical estimations. This unusual hypothesis is
supported by the increasing share of proﬁt in value added, by the development of credit market
in OECD countries and by the american increasing revenues inequalities. The model produces
endogeneous incentives to a more ﬂexible labor market and the development of credit market.
A global decreased competetive market gives an explanation of the barely growth of median
wage, compare to the growth of global productivity during the period of the Great Moderation.
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1 Introduction
During the last four decades, OECD economies have experienced a steady increased open-
ness usually called "`globalisation"'. Globalisation is said to have generated more competition
among companies which has improve the welfare of consumers. The pure rents, i.e the mono-
poly power which enables the ﬁrm sector to determinate price above the marginal cost, should
have decreased during this period,[25] Rogoﬀ (2003). However those rents are unobservable.
Some economists have analysed the evolution of diﬀerent variables which likely aﬀect them.
For [5]Blanchard et Philippon (2003), globalisation has led to more competition. The Product
Market deregulation seems to be the main cause. First of all, the index of barriers to entre-
preneurship (a composite of product market regulation) has clearly decrease in all important
OECD economies between 1975 and 1998. The deregulation began in the mid 1980's in Anglo-
Saxon countries. Secondly the level of foreign trade has increased which could explain a greater
competition. Thirdly the degree of state ownership of ﬁrms in the business sector has steadily
declined. All this three variables enables the authors to assess for a decrease of pure rents in
OECD economies.
Nevertheless the pure rents have not only fell because of the globalisation. According to
[28]Sirëon (2001), the pure rents have risen in several sectors for some special companies. The
globalisation enables consumers to have access to a greater range of products, but it also creates
a bigger market for one company. Thanks to economy of scales, a multinational company can
absorb greater ﬁxed cost, like R&D expenditure, to produce more value added output. A na-
tional monopoly (oligopoly) has incentives to become a global monopoly (oligopoly), as it is
illustrated in the aeronautic sector by Boeing and Airbus. A lot of high technology sectors are
indeed dominated by a large monopoly or oligopoly (Pharmacy, software, chain retailling...). Si-
roën (2001) added that globalisation could create less contestable market. Because of network
externality, a multinational ﬁrst entrant can impose its technology to all the market which
create a private monopoly that could be reinforced by TRIPS, the WTO's intellectual property
rights agreements. [28]Siroën (2001) pinpointed the incentives for multinational company to
rise private barriers and to shape negative market discrimination.
Moreover some variables assess a rise in pure rents during this last 3 decades. On the one
hand the marketing expenditures which aim at diﬀrentiating the market and to develop loyal
consumption, have skyrocketed since the beginning of the 1980's. On the other hand, the num-
ber of european and american mergers have largelly increased. On Figure 1, we see the evolution
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of number of the largest european mergers notiﬁed at the European Commission. In the United
states, the numbers of mergers is at least ten times bigger, [28]Siroën (2001).
Fig. 1  Numbers of Largest European Mergers between 1990 and 2009
In the Figure 2, we compare the evolution of the american consumer price index with the
one of the american ﬁnished consumer good price index. We clearly see that the beginning of the
product market deregulation coincides with a larger growth in consumer price than in ﬁnished
consumer good price. This is not a proof but a clue for assessing a bigger rent for company
between producers and consumers. The evolution of the consumer price index is indeed biaised
by the development of services during the period.
Fig. 2  Evolution of american cpi and american fcgpi
We can reasonably suppose that there is two diﬀerent kinds of ﬁrms which are aﬀected in
diﬀerent way by the globalisation since the 1980's : the ones whose rent was decreased, the
ones whose rent was increased. The problem is to ﬁnd a model which could explain whether
the global rent in OCDE countries really fell.
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2 The Great Moderation and other stylised facts
2.1 Explaining the Great Moderation
In the macroeconomic Litterature we generally suppose that 1984 is a breaking year for the
american economy. A lot of empirical studies have showed a large decrease in the volatility of
GDP and the volatility of inﬂation. This is called the Great Moderation. It spread to Canda,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan and United Kingdom during the late 1970's and the 1980's, [29]
Summers (2005), [19]Maher Khaznaji and Louis Phaneuf (2008).
Fig. 3  The beginning of Great Moderation by country
Like explained in the remarks Governor Bernanke (2004)[6], the Great Moderation can be
interpreted like a decreasing trade-oﬀ between output volatitlity and inﬂation volatility of the
Monetary Authority : the New Keynesian Philips Curve moves from the right to the left since
the late 1970.
Fig. 4  Evolution of the New Keynesian Philips during the last three decades
A lot of papers have followed to determine the causes of the Great Moderation. The "Good
Luck Theory" about the smaller shocks in OECD economies convice less and less economists
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like [10]Domenico Giannone , Michele Lenza, Lucrezia Reichlin (2008) or [15] Gali and Gam-
betti (2008) whose empirical studies led to support explanations about structural changes. We
have to notice that their article shows an increase in the volatitlity of hours worked relative to
output between before and after 1984.
Most of the authors claim for a more trusted monetary policy in the United States. Unfortu-
nately this cause is not suﬃcient for explaining the English Great Moderation, like showed in
[2]Benati (2007).[8] Khan and Davis (2008) claim for a better stock management thanks to a
better use of technology and Just In Time. A more ﬂexible labor market would have generate
the great moderation according to [20]LIU Waggoner Tao Zha(2009), [19]Maher Khaznaji and
Louis Phaneuf (2008). The less energy dependancy would explain why the rise in oil price since
2002 didn't create stagﬂation, [22]Blanchard et Gali (2007), [24]Dhawan Jeske Silos (2008). To
ﬁnish, better credit accessibility could be one of the causes, [4]Bezemer (2009). But none of
them could explain the increased volatility of producer price index.
2.2 The producer price volatility puzzle
Dealing with the volatility of prices of the BtoC sector and the BtoB sector is very interesting
because we can show a puzzle : after the mid 1980's the volatility of the consumer price index
has decreased or remained quite the same, whereas the volatility of diﬀerent price index from
the industrial BtoB sector has suﬀered from a very large increase. This last sector is very
important because it was the most aﬀected by the globalisation, contrary to the service sector
whose output is less internationally tradable.
Fig. 5  American Standard Deviation of intermediate product price index, industrial producer
price index, ﬁnal consumer good price index, consumer price index
Using mensual data from St Louis Fed between 1950 and 2009, we see that the volatility of
the three BtoB prices have increased. The volatility of the american intermediate product price
index was about 2.892 between 1954 and 1984, whereas it increased to 3.666 between 1984 and
2005. The volatility of industrial producer price was 2.795 and became 3.863. The volatility of
ﬁnished consumer good price index was 2.474 during the ﬁrst period and rised to 2.810 during
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the second period. The volatility of consumer price index decreased from 1.706 to 1.350.
Fig. 6  Canadian Standard Deviation of manufactured product price index and consumer
price index
Using canadian trimestrial data from the OECD database between 1956 and 2009, we show
that the volatility of the canadian manufactured product price index has doubled, from 0.64
to 1.28, to between the period 1958-1984 and the period 1985-2007. The consumer price index
grew a little bit from 0.38 to 0.49 during the same period, which can be considered like a
stagnation of this volatility.
Fig. 7  Australian Standard Deviation of manufactured product price index and consumer
price index
Using australian trimestial data from the OECD database between 1968 and 2009, we show
that the volatility of the australian manufactured product price index has largely increased,
from 0.32 to 1.30, between the period 1968-1984 and the period 1985-2008. The consumer price
index only grew from 0.29 to 0.51 during the same periods.
In theorical words, we can therefore assert that the New Keynesian Philips Curve using
producer price index remained quite the same or moved to the right, whereas the New Keynesian
Philips Curve using consumer price index moved to the left. In this paper, we are interesting in
the moves of NKPC, not in the initial locus of price index varaibilities. A new explanation of
the Great Moderation according to the Teory of Firm Litterature will enable us to create the
model explaining this puzzle.
2.3 The spread vertical network : the "`network ﬁrm"'model
Research in Theory of Firm brings a very interesting information about the commun mu-
tation of the structure of big companies in the OECD economies. During the late 1970's and
the 1980's their governance have changed a lot. During the decades before, the "`Ford Shape"'
was most spread structure of big ﬁrms. They were very vertically integrated and the strategy
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oriented to quantity and price priority. But at the end of the 1960's, consumers asked for bet-
ter quality and diﬀerentiation. In addition competition arised because of the product market
deregulation.
[23]Porter (1980) described how companies began to externalize all the activities which not
belonged to their core activites to keep the most proﬁtable ones. The horizontal and vertical
networks of ﬁrms was imposed in all activities and sectors were the value added to output
was high, [1]El Herelli Afef (2007). But the horizontal network is not so long lasting than the
vertical network. The most famous model of vertical network is the model of the "`network
ﬁrm"' : a leader ﬁrm driving a range of smaller ones. Generally, the driven ﬁrms are juridically
and ﬁnancially independant. They work with the leader ﬁrm to gather their special abilities
by contractualizing their relationship, [13]Fréry (2001),[11] Paché and Bacus-Montfort (2003),
[14]Fulconis(2003). This kind of structure, called the "`network ﬁrm"' ﬁts both ﬂexibility and
innovation constraints that the market laid down. Almost every sectors of OECD economies
were aﬀected by this mutation during the 1980's. Running a "`network ﬁrm"' became more
and more easier with more and more eﬃcient ICT,[11] Paché, Bacus and Montfort(2003). In
the "`network ﬁrm"' model, the leader ﬁrm runs all the supply chain, by organising logistics
between smaller ﬁrms. Generally, the leader ﬁrm is in charge of the R&D, the sailling activities,
marketing activities, big ﬁnancial activities (like mergers) and quality control activities of the
"`network ﬁrm"'. We have to add that high skilled labor is generally employed in the leader
ﬁrm. The average skill of employees in smaller ﬁrms is lower.
To sum up, the leader ﬁrm aims at improve the productivity of the whole "`network ﬁrm"' by
improving the output between the smaller ﬁrms and ﬁnal consumers. Firms which enjoyed a
increase of their mark-up, discribed by [28]Siroën (2001), have commun features with leader
ﬁrms driven smaller ones in the network ﬁrm model. Keeping this hypothesis, we develop a
NKPC model where the leader ﬁrms will refer to the downstream ﬁrms and the smaller ﬁrms
to the upstream ﬁrms.
3 The New Keynesian Model
3.1 The failure of the Calvo model
[18] Khan(2004) studied the eﬀect of market structure on the slope of the New keynesian Phi-
lips Curve. The reduced-forms obtained by the Calvo,[7] Calvo(1983), and the Rotemberg,[26]Rotemberg(1982),
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price setting assumptions are the same, [27]Rotemberg(1987). But, for the former, an increased
competition among ﬁrms implies a decrease of the slope, whereas for the latter an increased
competition generate an increase of the slope. Supposing a greater competition because of the
globalisation, like in [5]Blanchard and Philippon (2003), and assessing for the decrease of the
slope of the New keynesian Philips Curve using consumer price indexes from diﬀerent OECD
economies, the author concluded that the predictions of the Calvo model was consistent with
the Great Moderation.
however the globalisation increased competition mostly among industrial and manufactured
ﬁrms, because services are far less tradable. But the variability of industrial and manufactured
product price index increased a lot during the period of the Great Moderation. Because of this
evidence, the Rotemberg model seems to be more suitable. That's why we use in a simple New
Keynesian Model, with Rotemberg price setting assumptions, which diﬀerentiates upstream
ﬁrm and downstream ﬁrm.
3.2 Households
We assume a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived and identical households. The representative
household maximises a discounted sum of expected utilities :
Ωt (j) =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tEt
{
1
1− σC
1−σ
s −
1
1 + ψ
L
1+ψ
s
}
where β is the subjective discount factor, Ct =
[∫ 1
0 Ct(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1 , the Dixit-Stiglitz constant
elasticity-of-substitution-compsumtion index, Ct (i) represents consumption of the ith good, Lt
is the supply of labour. σ > 0, is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of aggregate
expenditure. ψ is the desutility of labour, or the inverse of Frish elasticity.
The households are limited by the standard budjet contraint :
PtCt +
Bt+1
(1 + rt)
= (1− τ)WtLt + (1− τ)Lhs +Bt + (1− τ) Πut + (1− τ) Πdt + Tt +G
Pt =
[∫ 1
0 Pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ is the price consumer index, Bt is a bond which enable to save
between to periods. Wt is the nominal wage. Lhs is a constant cost faced by downstream ﬁrms.
Πut denotes the proﬁt of the total proﬁt of the upstream company, and Π
d
t is the same for the
downstream company. Tt is the cost of changing price for all the companies.τ is the average tax
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rate for all the economy. Taxes fund exactly the public expenditure G(t). The utility maximising
conditions are
λt =
C−σt
Pt
Lψt =
Wt
Pt
C−σt
Et
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(1 + rt)
]
= 1
3.3 The Firms
3.4 The upstream sector
Each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated intermediate good indexed by i. They are uniformly
distributed on the interval [0; 1]. They operate in a monopolistically competitive market with
the same production function.
Y ut (j) = AtL
α
t (i)
Each ﬁrm faces a demand curve from the downstream sector :
Y ut (j) =
1∫
0
(
P ut (j)
P ut
)θu
Y dt (i)di
with Y dt (i) =
[∫ 1
0 Y
u
t (i, j)
θu−1
θu dj
] θu
θu−1
the demand from the downstream ﬁrm i to all the dif-
ferentiated upstream ﬁrms j, and Y ut (j) =
∫ 0
1 Y
u
t (i, j) di the total output of the downstream
ﬁrm j. P ut (j) is the price of the upstream ﬁrm j and P
d
t (i) the price of the downtream ﬁrm
i. 0 < α < 1 is the elasticity of upstream output with respect to labour. θu is elasticity of
demand for downstream ﬁrm j. We implicitely assume that the capital stock is ﬁrm speciﬁc
and constant over time.
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3.5 The downstream sector
Each upstream ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated ﬁnal good indexed by i. They are uniformly
distributed on the interval [0; 1]. They operate in a monopolistically competitive market with
the same production function.
Yt (i) = A
dY dt (i)
As presented before, the activity of the downstream ﬁrm consists in improving the out-
put of the upstream sector by organising the whole organistion thanks to the development of
marketing, logistics, ﬁnancial and R&D services.
Each ﬁrm faces a demand curve from the ﬁnal consumer :
Yt (i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt
with Yt =
[∫ 1
0 Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1 for the aggregate demand. Pt (i) is the price of the downstream
ﬁrm i.
3.6 The Rotemberg model
Following [26]Rotemberg (1982), each ﬁrm of both sectors faces a quadratic cost of no-
minal price adjustement, measured in terms of the ﬁnal good. For uptstream ﬁrms, the cost
adjustement is
c
2
(
P ut (j)
piP ut−1 (j)
− 1
)2
Yt
Ad
and for the downstream ﬁrms, it is
c
2
(
P dt (i)
piP dt−1 (i)
− 1
)2
Yt
where c ≥ 0 determines the magnitude of the price adjustement cost and pi ≥ 1 is the gross
steady-state inﬂation rate. In a symetric equilibrium the optimal price P u∗t (j) is the same for
all ﬁrms, P u∗t (j) = P
u
t . In addition P
d∗
t (i) = Pt, Y
d
t (i) = Y
d
t , Yt (i) = Yt, Wt (j) = Wt.The
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aggregate resource contraint becomes
(1− τ)Yt = Ct +
( P ut (j)
piP ut−1 (j)
− 1
)2
1
Ad
+
(
P dt (i)
piP dt−1 (i)
− 1
)2 c
2
Yt
3.7 The Rotemberg model for the upstream ﬁrms
The representative upstream ﬁrm chooses P ut (j) at each period to maximise the proﬁt.
We assume that upstream ﬁrms cannot forsee the optimal P ut (j), because in a small ﬁrm the
ﬁnancial and accounting departement is less developed and because the downstream ﬁrms could
change bargaining price conditions by using their potential greater market power induced by
the "`network ﬁrm"' model.
P ut (j)maxΠ
u
t =
(
P ut (j)
P ut
) 1∫
0
(
P ut (j)
P ut
)−θu (P dt (i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt
Ad
di−
 1∫
0
(
P ut (j)
P ut
)−θu (Pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt
Ad
di

1
α
Wt (j)
Pt
− c
2
(
P ut (j)
piP ut−1 (j)
− 1
)2
Yt
Ad
The ﬁrst order condition can be written as :
(1− θu) (P
u∗
t (j))
−θu
(P ut )
1−θu
Yt
Ad
−
(
Yt
AdAt
) 1α (
−θ
u
α
)
(P u∗t (j))
− θu
α
−1
(P ut )
−θu
α
Wt
Pt
− c
(
P u∗t (j)
piP u∗t−1 (j)
)
Yt
Ad
1
piP u∗t−1 (j)
= 0
At the symetric equilibrium, we can log-linearised this equation as
pu∗t =
θu − 1
c
1− α + ψ + σα
α
y˜t + p
u∗
t−1
with
y˜t = yt − ynt
y˜t denotes the global output gap betwenn the ﬁnal output yt and the natural output ynt .
We will assume that the log-linearised inﬂation rate of downstream prices is
piut = p
u∗
t − pu∗t−1
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3.8 The Rotemberg model for the downstream ﬁrms
The core functions of the downstream ﬁrm (leader ﬁrm or strategic center) is the conception,
coordination and the monitoring of the supply chain [12]Fréry (1997). There is no direct link
betwenn these three tasks and the quantity of output. We will then suppose that the cost of
labor in dowstream ﬁrms is constant. In addition, the downstream ﬁrms have developed their
accounting and ﬁnancial departements very well. That's why we consider they can use more
information than upstream ﬁrms to determine the next period optimal prices. Given P u∗t (j) a
downstream ﬁrm chooses a sequence of P dt (i) to maximize the expected sum of future discounted
proﬁts.
Et
∞∑
s=t
Rt+s
(P dt+s (i)
Pt+s
)1−θ
Yt+s −
(
P dt+s (i)
Pt+s
)−θ
1
Ad
P u∗t+s
Pt+s
Yt+s − c
2
(
P dt+s (i)
piP dt+s−1 (i)
− 1
)2
Yt+s − Lhs

where Rt+s = βs
(
Ct+s
Ct
)−σ (
Pt
Pt+s
)
is the stochastic discount factor. Lhs is the constant cost of
high skilled labor employed by the downstream ﬁrm whose value makes Πdt > 0 since big ﬁrms
have given stock dividends to shareholders in average during the Great Moderation.
The ﬁrst order condition can be written as :
Pt =
 1
θ
θ−1 +
c
θpi
[(
pit
pi
− 1
)
pit − β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ Yt+1
Yt
(
pit+1
pi
− 1
)
pit+1
]
 P u∗tAd = µtP
u∗
t
Ad
where µt is the mark-up over the marginal cost Wtα Y
1
α
−1
t . There are two terms in the denominator
of the mark-up. The ﬁrst term, θ
θ−1 represents the standard mark-up and the second term
c
θpi
[(
pit
pi
− 1
)
pit − β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ Yt+1
Yt
(
pit+1
pi
− 1
)
pit+1
]
represents the net cost associated with price adjusment. When there is no stickiness (c = 0),
the mark-up is the same as the desired mark-up, θ
θ−1 . Log-linearise this last equation gives
pit =
θ − 1
c
pu∗t + Etβpit+1
then the ﬁnal new keynesian Philips curve obtain is :
pit =
θ − 1
c
θu − 1
c
1− α + ψ + σα
α
y˜t +
θ − 1
c
pu∗t−1 + Etβpit+1
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3.9 Market structure and the Slope of NKPC
The steady state elasticity of demand for the representative downtream ﬁrm θu, and an
upstream ﬁrm θ , capture the degree of substituability betwenn their own goods and those of
thier competitors. These elasticities are inversely related to the desired mark-up over cost that
ﬁrms want to charge for their output. A higher substituability between goods implies a higher
degree of competition among ﬁrms, and a lower desired mark-up (a reduction in ﬁrm's price
power). A structral increase in competition among ﬁrms is interpreted in terms of a one oﬀ
increase in the (steady state) elasticity.
In a NKPC with Rotemberg price setting assumption, a higher competition among ﬁrms in-
creases the slope of the Phillips curve and tends to magnify inﬂationnary pressures. Actually
higher competition makes changing prices relatively cheaper (the second term in denominator).
For a given magnitude of price adjustement cost, c, a higher θ or θu, lowers the net cost asso-
ciated with adjusting prices. The size of the optimal price adjustement falls with the increase
of competition (as θ or θu increase), which makes price adjustement relatively cheaper for a
ﬁrm when facing quadratic adjustment cost. This eﬀect promotes price ﬂexibility and increases
the slope of the Phillips Curve.
3.10 The Monetary Policy Rule
We will close the model by assuming a simple monetary policy rule :
rt = φpit
3.11 The Equilibrium
For sequence of productivity shocks {At}∞t=0 a symetric equilibrium is a sequence of quan-
tities :
{Qt}∞t=0 =
{
Yt, Y
n
t , Y˜t, Ct, Lt,Π
d
t ,Π
u
t , Tt
}∞
t=0
that satisfy households and ﬁrm optimality conditions for a given set of prices,
{Pt}∞t=0 = {Wt, P ut , Pt, rt}∞t=0
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3.12 The log linearised model around the steady state
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(rt − Etpit+1)
ψlt = wt − σyt
yt = at + αlt
pu∗t =
θu − 1
c
1− α + ψ + σα
α
y˜t + p
u∗
t−1
piut = p
u∗
t − pu∗t−1
y˜t = yt − ynt
ynt =
ψ + 1
1− α + ασ + ψat
pit =
θ − 1
c
θu − 1
c
1− α + ψ + σα
α
y˜t +
θ − 1
c
pu∗t−1 + Etβpit+1
rt = φpit
at+1 = ρat + t
avec
0 < ρ < 1
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where t is a white noise.
4 Simulations
4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated using values that are close to calibrations of [? ]Khan (2004), [21]
Lombardo and Vestin(2007). The discount facor β = 0.99. α = 0.7 denotes the average share
of labour in the total output. ψ = 2 and σ = 2. φ will move from 1,1 to 2,1. c = 2000.ρ is
calibrated to 0.9 .
4.2 Results
As explained before, the market structure of the upstream ﬁrms and the downstream ﬁrms
depends on the value of θu and θ. By using the Rotemberg model and assuming that competition
among industrial and manufactured ﬁrms has increased, we have to decrease the value of θu
between before and after 1984. To recreate a move from the right to the left of NKPC for
consumer price index (i.e optimal price of the downstream sector), we must keep the hypothesis
that the global markup has increased :
|4θu| < |4θ|
To illustrate the market structure of the upstream ﬁrm we will choose θu = 7, before the Great
Moderation and θu = 10 during the Great Moderation. Concerning the downstream sector,
θ = 10 will decrease to θ = 5 during the same periods. The ﬁrst simulation illustrates moves of
the trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation volatilities. In [22]Blanchard and Gali (2007), this
kind of curves doesn't ﬁt the empirical volatilities too. For this paper the ecplanation is the
same : the model is too simple. In [22] Blanchard and Gali (2007), the range of volatilities
values belong to a interval between 0 and 0.9, our model gives a interval between 0 and 1.25
which is quite close to the empirical values.
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Fig. 8  Evolution of the NKPC for upstream (ppi) and downstream ﬁrms (cpi) before and
during the Great Moderation
More interesting results are obtained when we represent the NKPC with the volatility
of inﬂation and the volatility of the output gap for the downstream ﬁrm during the Great
Moderation. For this calibration, the theorical value of the slope of NKPC varies around 0.75.
[18]Kahn(2004) used a GMM method to estimate the empirical value of this slope for major
OECD countries. He found values from 0 to 0.3 but he added lagged inﬂation and expected
inﬂation in his regression. Unsing a simple linear regression, we consider that our result is quite
consitent whith [18]Kahn (2004) results .
Fig. 9  NKPC illustration and equation for downstream ﬁrms during the Great Moderation
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The next simulation shows a increase of the wage volatility, which is hightlighted in the
empirical studies of [16]Gervais (2009) but not really explained by structural changes, and
payroll. According to the theory of Permanent Revenue, incentives to smooth consumption by
enjoying credit services should have increased. This theory is consistent with the credit market
development in all OECD countries since the begenning of the 1980's.
Fig. 10  Standard deviation of wage for diﬀerent monetary policies
Fig. 11  Standard deviation of payroll for diﬀerent monetary policies
Finally the model predicts shows that the volatility of employment relative to ouput in-
creases when the mark-up of the downstream ﬁrm decreases. To illustrate this fact, φ = 1.5,
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and θ decrease from 15 to 2. In [15]Gali and Gambetti (2008), the standard deviation of worked
hours relative to the output one increases too, but from 0.65 in 1965 to 0.84 in 2005. The
simulation generate standard deviations between 2 and 4.5. However the labor market is here
totally ﬂexible. We can conclude that more the mark-up of the dowstream ﬁrm is high, higher
are the endogeneous incentives to promote a more ﬂexible labor market.
Fig. 12  Standard deviation of labor relative to the output
However the model is weak because it predicts an increase in hours worked volatility, whereas
[15] Gali and Gambetti (2008), [16]Gervais (2009) found a decrease. But two explanations arise
about the limits of this model. First the mutation of big companies structure does not aﬀect the
whole OECD economy but a large part of it. In the unaﬀected sectors the volatility of worked
hours should lead the drecreased volatility of the global output. Secondly the nature of jobs have
changed a lot since the late 1970's. The changing accounting methods towards Activity Based
Costing, since 1988 [3], show that costs are more and more indirect, generated less and less
hours worked volatilities relative to output. The present model just helps to understand why
the decrease volatility of worked hours is less important than the decrease of output volatility.
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5 What concequences for an increase of global rent in OECD
economies during the Great Moderation
Companies where employees are more than 500 hire a minority of the total labor force. These
large company can be associated with downstream ﬁrms in the model. Moreover households
who beneﬁts from the proﬁt generated by these big companies thanks to stocks holding are
a minority too in all OECD countries. From the model and the increased rent of dowstream
ﬁrms, we can ﬁrstly conclude that both minorities has beneﬁt from globalisation during the
Great Moderation, whereas the global welfare has falled. The proﬁt share in value added should
increase as revenues inequalities should grow.
Two consistent empirical facts are that we ﬁnd empirically that revenues inequalities grows in
the United States and the wage share have steadily decreased in OECD economies during the
Great moderation period, Ellis and Smith (2007). If we add to the proﬁt share the wage of
the best paid employees, that to say the top managers, the decrease would be more important,
[17]Harrisson (2009) and [9]Dew Becker Gordon (2005).
Fig. 13  Growing revenues inequalities in the United States
Fig. 14  Proﬁt and wage share in value added in major OECD economies
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In addition these papers show that the growth of the real median wages grew barely and
less than the growth of the average productivity during the period of the Great Moderation.
One ﬁrst reason could be that high-skilled employees enjoy a productivity growth higher than
the others. Doubts can be easily raised because activities of high-skilled employees are more or
less directed to service like R&D and Management, which aim at increase the productivity of
the other employees but are not aﬀected by a own large productivity growth. A more suitable
reason could lay in the model. With the increase of the market power of downstream ﬁrms,
a rise in upstream ﬁrms productivity cannot generate a proportionnal decrease of consumer
price index : they have less intencives to drop their prices close to the marginal cost which has
decreased. Real wages of upsteam employees don't rise as much as they ought to in a more com-
petetive economy. The positive productivity shock generates more proﬁt for the downstream
ﬁrm.
Thanks to the conclusion of the model, we understand why the wage of the 10% of the best
paid employees have raised, if we add the top managers wage to the proﬁt share [9]Dew Becker
Gordon (2005). We also understand why the median wage barely grew, less than the produc-
tivity growth, during the Great Moderation in the United States and Canada, [17] Harrisson
(2009).
Thirdly the payroll of the smaller companies, which employ the majority of the workforce
and the poorest part of it, should have been dampened according to the model. This prediction
is consitent with the evolution of the income shares of low-skilled and high-skilled labor in
OECD countries since the early 1980's.
Fig. 15  High-skilled and low-skilled income share in value added
The income of low-skill employees have decreased in average, whereas its volatility increa-
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sed. The development of the credit market have then endogeneous causes in this model, which
is consistent with the empirical development of this market in all major OECD economies since
the late 1970's.
To ﬁnish we can add two remarks. Almost every OECD countries have suﬀered from public
imbalances since the begenning of the 1980's. The model gives is own explanation. For the same
relative public expenditure, OECD governments need a higher growth of productivity to keep
their public budget balanced during the Great Moderation. Because an increase in the global
mark-up (i.e "`pure rent"') lower tax revenues if the productivity growth is constant. Now, it is
generally accepted that the modern economies, productivity growth is relatively lower because
of the weak productivity growth in services.
The last remark is about the timing of the evolution of the two mark-up studied in the mo-
del, which is deﬁnitively unsure. But if the market power of downstream ﬁrms have increased
(protection against increased competition) before the fall of upstream ﬁrm markup (trade-oﬀ
from downstream ﬁrm between traditionnal or new suppliers), unemployment should have ri-
sen before falling. That's what empirically happened in Europe according to [5]Blanchard and
Phillipon (2003).
6 Conclusion
Globalisation have generated a more or less competetive market according to the kind of
ﬁrm. If ﬁrms use high technology and very costly input, they may have increased their mark-
up. More traditionnal ﬁrm, often smaller ﬁrms, they may have decrease their mark-up. Since
[18]Kahn (2004), the Great moderation has structural causes such as market power, which
is possible to study through the reduced form of the NKPC obtained with the Calvo and
Rotemberg price setting assumptions. The Calvo model highlighted in [18]Kahn (2004) fails to
predict the increase of price volatility on business to business markets where competition has
deﬁnitively increased, notably in the manufactured sector.
Therefore, we have used a simple New Keynesian model with upstream and downstream ﬁrms,
where both are constraint by the Rotemberg price setting assumption. The only way to replicate
the Great moderation is to assume an increase of the global markup. By our calibration, we
replicate a theorical value of the NKPC close to the ones estimated by [18]Kahn (2004) for
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major OECD economies.
Incentives for supporting a more ﬂexible labor market become endogeneous. The hypothesis of a
rise of the global "`pure rent"' is consitent with increasing share of proﬁt in value added in OECD
economies and the revenues inequalities evolution in the United States. A less competetive
market gives an explanation of the barely growth of median wage, compare to the growth of
global productivity during the period of the Great Moderation.
future research : increasing proﬁt of downstream ﬁrms as a cause of the no stagﬂation during
the recent oil price shock by absorbing the negative shock.
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Derivation of the NKPC under R model
When there is no price stickiness (c=0), both kind of ﬁrms charge its own mark-up over its
current marginal cost
Pt =
θ
θ − 1
P u∗t
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In the ﬂexible price equilibrium (c = 0), the equilibrium output, Y nt , is given by
1 =
θ
θ − 1
θu
θu − 1
1
α
(
1
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) 1+ψ
α
+1 ( 1
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) 1+ψ
α
Y
1+ψ
α
+σ−1
t
because the aggregate resource contraint is
Ct = Yt
Finally we can write
Y nt =
[
θ − 1
θ
θu − 1
θu
α
(
Ad
) 1+ψ
α
+1
] 1
1+ψ
α +σ−1
(At)
ψ+1
1−α+ασ+ψ
The log-linearised equation of the natural output is :
ynt =
ψ + 1
1− α + ασ + ψat
The eﬃcient level of output, in the absence of technology shocks is
Y et = 1
Because T = 0 at the steady state, The log-linearised aggregate resource constraint with ad-
justment price cost is
yt = ct
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at the symetric equilibrium the log-linearised marginal cost of upstream ﬁrms is
mctut = wt −
at
α
+
(
1
α
− 1
)
yt
which becomes
mctut =
(
1 + ψ
α
)
at +
(
1
α
− 1 + ψ
α
+ σ
)
yt
Then we easily obtain marginal cost of upstream ﬁrms according to the global output gap :
mctut =
1− α + ψ + σα
α
(yt − ynt )
.1 The upstream ﬁrms
When there is no price stickiness (c=0), all ﬁrms charge a mark-up over current marginal
cost
A ﬁrm chooses P u∗t (j) to maximise the proﬁt at each period t.
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The ﬁrst order condition is
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If we log-linearise this equation a the symetric equilibrium, we obtain :
pu∗t =
θu
c
1− α + ψ + σα
α
y˜t + p
u∗
t−1
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with
y˜t = yt − ynt
where y˜t = log
(
Yt
Ye
)
− log
(
Y nt
Ye
)
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